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“It will, I hope, be demonstrated...that the superficially incompatible systems of
ideas associated on the one hand with a personalistic [Bayesian] view of probabil-
ity and on the other hand with the objectivistically inspired developments of the
[classical] British-American School do in fact lend each other mutual support and
clarification.”
– L. J. Savage (1954, 5)
1 Introduction
In classical statistics, the “stopping rule” that governs the decision to stop collecting data
for the purpose of some inference or decision typically affects the calculations that guide
that inference or decision. In Bayesian statistics, by contrast, stopping rules typically make
no difference to posterior probabilities. For this reason, they are often taken to be irrelevant
to Bayesian decisions.
However, I point out in this paper that Bayesian principles actually can require a
decision-maker to attend to differences in stopping rules in a kind of situation that is com-
∗Thanks to Samuel Fletcher, Konstantin Genin, Stephan Hartmann, Daniel Malinsky, Conor Mayo-
Wilson, and the attendees at a works-in-progress session at the Munich Center for Mathematical Philosophy
for comments and feedback on earlier drafts. This work was supported by a Visiting Fellowship from the
Munich Center for Mathematical Philosophy.
1
mon in scientific practice, in which the choice of a decision policy could influence choices
about stopping rules in ways that do not align with the decision-maker’s interests. I then
argue that recognizing the relevance of stopping rules to decision-making in cases of this
kind is sufficient to accommodate classical statistical intuitions about stopping rules insofar
as those intuitions are compelling.
The issue of the role that stopping rules should play in inference and decision has great
practical significance. It is important for decisions based on data from scientific studies to
be made efficiently. In medical research, for instance, lives may be at stake. As a result,
there has been interest in designs for clinical trials of new medical treatments that allow
researchers to look at their data multiple times, each time deciding whether to declare
a new treatment effective, declare it ineffective, or continue the trial. Within a classical
statistical approach, looking at the data multiple times has significant costs: it complicates
trial planning and analysis, and it requires a more stringent standard for declaring the
treatment to be effective on a given look. Within a Bayesian approach, by contrast, looking
at the data multiple times has no drawbacks other than the time and energy it requires:
one does not need to take into account how many times one has looked or will look at an
accumulating body of data in order to use that body of data to update one’s beliefs in
a Bayesian manner. Bayesians often tout this feature of their approach as an advantage
(e.g. Edwards et al., 1963; Berry, 2006), while advocates of classical methods regard it as
a source of concern (Mayo and Kruse, 2001). I claim that the gap between Bayesians and
frequentists on this issue is not as large as it might appear because the frequentist practice
of attending to differences among stopping rules often has a Bayesian rationale.
As indicated in the epigraph, Savage had originally hoped to use Bayesian concepts to
support and clarify, rather than overthrow, classical statistical ideas. Along those lines,
he claimed that the classical commitment to randomization in experimental design has
a Bayesian justification, despite initial appearances to the contrary (Savage, 1961, 585).
However, he could not see a role for attention to differences among noninformative stopping
rules in Bayesian procedures (Edwards et al., 1963, 239), and on the whole he came to
“[lose] faith in the devices” of classical statistics (Savage, 1972, iv). Here I aim to show that
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Savage and other Bayesians have missed an opportunity to support and clarify, rather than
overthrow, the role that stopping rules play in classical statistical inference.
2 An Example
The classical and Bayesian views about the (ir)relevance of stopping rules to inference and
decision can both be made to seem unreasonable. Consider the following pair of scenarios.
Scenario 1. A scientist who works for a pharmaceutical company—call her
“Mammona”—is testing a new drug. Mammona is selfish, and if the FDA ap-
proves the drug then the value of her company stock will increase. As a result,
she would prefer that the FDA approve the drug regardless of whether it is more
effective than the current standard of care. As a result, she decides to give the
drug to patients and record whether or not they recover until either her funds are
exhausted or the data from her trial fit the claim that the drug is more effective
than the current standard of care to a particular degree.
Scenario 2. In another possible world, a different pharmaceutical company
scientist—call her “Charis”—is testing the same drug as Mammona. Charis is
a humanitarian, so she would prefer that the FDA approve the drug if and only
if it is more effective than the current standard of care. As a result, she decides
to give the drug to a number of patients that is fixed in advance rather than
waiting for seemingly favorable results as Mammona does.
Suppose that in these two scenarios, it just happens that Mammona and Charis treat
exactly the same patients and get exactly the same outcomes. Both scientists report their
data to the FDA, as well as the “stopping rule” they used to decide when to stop collecting
data.
It might seem obvious that the FDA should be more reluctant to approve the drug in
the scenario in which it receives Mammona’s results than in the scenario in which it receives
Charis’s results, in accordance with classical statistics. After all, Mammona’s procedure is
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more likely than Charis’s to yield a result that fits the hypothesis that their drug is more
effective than the standard of care to some degree even if that hypothesis is false. The
degree to which either of their data seem to indicate that the drug is more effective than
the current standard of care will almost inevitably fluctuate somewhat as the trial proceeds,
regardless of the truth. Mammona’s procedure, unlike Charis’s can take advantage of this
noise in the data by “stopping on a random high.” One might think that this fact must be
taken into account in assessing the import of Mammona’s reported outcomes. If the FDA
allowed procedures like Mammona’s and did not account for their error characteristics in its
decisions, then it would approve a greater proportion of ineffective drugs than if it insisted
on fixed-sample designs like Charis’s. These considerations tend to make the Bayesian view
about the relevance of stopping rules to inference and decision seem unreasonable.
On the other hand, the two scenarios involve the same hypotheses, the same patients,
and the same outcomes. How, then, could the evidential import of the data with respect to
the effectiveness of the drug be different? And if the evidential import is not different, then
how could there be a difference in which inferences and decisions are warranted? We can
prefer Charis’s stopping rule to Mammona’s, but that is a matter of before-trial planning,
rather than after-trial inference and decision. The difference in the stopping rule in the two
cases is simply a difference in the intentions of the experimenters about whether or not they
would have kept going if the data had been different, which seems completely irrelevant to
the import of the data their experiments actually produced. These considerations tend to
make the classical view about the relevance of stopping rules to inference and decision seem
unreasonable.
How can these competing intuitions be resolved? In the next section (Section 3), I explain
how core Bayesian principles entail that differences among stopping rules are irrelevant to
the degrees of belief one should have in the relevant hypotheses in light of the data in typical
cases. Then in Section 4, I explain why Bayesians should nevertheless take those differences
into account in decision-making in circumstances that are common in scientific practice.
Finally, in Section 5 I argue that an appropriately nuanced Bayesian position conforms to
the classical position insofar as that position is plausible and thus successfully reconciles
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competing intuitions about the relevance of stopping rules to inference and decision.
3 The Irrelevance of Differences among Noninformative
Stopping Rules to Posterior Probabilities
Suppose the variables X1, X2, . . . have a joint distribution p(·) that depends on the value
of some parameter θ, and that the values of those variables arrive in sequence. After each
observation Xi, you have the choice to stop observing or to continue. That decision may be
influenced by the data that have been observed so far, but it is not influenced by θ except
through the data. A stopping rule that satisfies these conditions is called noninformative.
Given a noninformative stopping rule s that gives probability c(xi) of observing another
variable after observing xi = x1, . . . , xi, the probability density ps(·) of observing exactly
xN = x1, . . . , xN is
ps(x
N |θ) = c(∅)p(x1|θ)c(x1)p(x2|x
1, θ) . . . c(xN−1)p(xN |x
N−1, θ)(1− c(xN ))
∝ ΠNi=1p(xi|x
i−1, θ)
= p(xN |θ)
In words, the probability that an experiment with a particular noninformative stopping
rule would yield a particular body of data, given θ, is proportional (as a function of θ) to
the probability that the variables that are actually observed would take on the values they
actually take, given θ. The stopping rule plays no role in fixing that probability up to a
constant of proportionality; it only affects the value of that constant.
It follows that differences among noninformative stopping rules make no difference to
posterior probabilities under Bayesian conditioning (Raiffa and Schlaifer, 1961, 37–8). For
Bayes’s rule says that the posterior probability distribution over θ given xN is given by the
following expression.
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f(θ|xN ) =
ps(x
N |θ)f(θ)
∫
ps(xN |θ)f(θ) dθ
=
p(xN |θ)f(θ)
∫
p(xN |θ)f(θ) dθ
where replacing ps with p is possible because the constant of proportionality that the stop-
ping rule introduces can be pulled out of the integral in the denominator and cancelled out
in the numerator and the denominator.
The fact that Mammona’s stopping rule is “biased,” stopping on evidence that favors
one hypothesis over another but not vice-versa, does not make it informative in the tech-
nical sense. Suppose her precise rule is to stop after observation xi if either i = 1000 (at
which point her funds are exhausted) or the likelihood ratio p(xi|θa)/p(xi|θ0) reaches some
threshold for a particular pair of values θa and θ0 of θ. In this case, the decision to stop after
a particular observation is determined by the data that have been observed so far, without
any further dependence on θ. Thus, it seems that the rule must be noninformative.
In fact, not enough has been said to determine whether Mammona’s stopping rule is
informative for a given observer. It suffices to show that Mammona’s stopping rule is non-
informative for Mammona, but not that it is noninformative for a third party. Suppose the
FDA regulator who receives Mammona’s data—call him “Krino”—suspects that Mammona
might have run a pilot study that she did not report, and that she would not have taken the
risk of using a “biased” stopping rule (which might, let use say, cause the FDA to disregard
her data entirely) unless the pilot data had been unfavorable to the new drug. Then Krino’s
probabilities for hypotheses about the effectiveness of the drug will be affected by what he
learns about her stopping rule, even after he conditions on the data she reports. For Krino,
the decision to stop at a particular point is not (epistemically) independent of θ, given the
data, in this scenario. Thus, the stopping rule is informative for him. However, it is not
informative for him or anyone else simply by virtue of the fact that it is “biased.” Any
stopping rule can be informative for someone in a scenario in which it provides him or her
with information about suspected undisclosed data. In what follows, I assume Krino knows
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that Mammona chooses a stopping rule by a criterion that is not sensitive to any undisclosed
data she might have, so that her stopping rule is not informative for him.
Outside of special circumstances, then, Mammona and Charis’s stopping rules are non-
informative. Bayesian posterior probabilities are not affected by differences among nonin-
formative stopping rules. This fact is often taken to imply that a Bayesian who is going
to make a decision to which the value of some parameter θ is relevant need not attend to
differences among stopping rules that are noninformative with respect to θ. However, this
further claim does not follow and is in fact false in an important class of cases, as I explain
in the next section.
4 A Bayesian Should Attend to Differences Among Non-
informative Stopping Rules in Some Cases Despite
Their Irrelevance to Posterior Probabilities
It was shown in the previous section that differences among noninformative stopping rules
are irrelevant to Bayesian posterior probabilities. It seems to follow that they are irrelevant
to Bayesian decision making. After all, Bayesians make decisions by maximizing expected
utility, and the expected utility of a decision depends only on the relevant posterior proba-
bilities and utilities. It seems that utility of making a particular decision (for instance, to
approve a drug or not) would not typically depend on the stopping rule that was used in
some experiment that has already been performed, so there does not seem to be any way
for differences among noninformative stopping rules to influence Bayesian decisions.
The problem with this argument is that the utility of making a particular decision can,
and often does, depend on which noninformative stopping rule is used in a relevant exper-
iment. To see why, consider the fact that a Bayesian typically will have preferences before
an experiment is run about what stopping rule is used. For instance, Krino might prefer
Charis’s stopping rule to Mammona’s, or vice versa. As in the previous section, suppose that
Mammon’s rule is to stop after observation xi if either i = 1000 or p(x
i|θa)/p(xi|θ0) reaches
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some threshold for a particular pair of values θa and θ0 of θ. Suppose that Charis’s rule is
to stop after observation x100. Suppose that the hypotheses H0 : θ = θ0 and H1 : θ = θa
are known to be the only possibilities and that the best course of action from Krino’s per-
spective is to approve Charis and Mammona’s drug if Ha is true but not if H0 is true. Then
if Krino had to choose one of Charis and Mammona’s experiments to be performed and
the results reported to him, he may strictly prefer one of them over the other on grounds
of expected utility. This statement is perfectly compatible with the claim that if the two
experiments were to produce the same outcome then either one would lead him to the same
posterior probabilities; it arises from the fact that they give rise to different probability
distributions over different sets of possible outcomes, so that, speaking informally, Krino
would not necessarily expect them to be equally informative.
Now suppose that Krino engages in repeated public interactions with scientists like
Mammona and Charis. If he were to ignore differences among noninformative stopping rules,
then scientists could learn this fact and judge it to be in their interests to use stopping rules
like Mammona’s rather than Charis’s. But perhaps Krino prefers stopping rules like Charis’s.
Then it could be advantageous for him to give preferential treatment to rules like Charis’s
to avoid incentivizing experimental designs that he dislikes. The crucial assumption here is
that Krino is engaged in repeated interactions with scientists and that scientists are able
to observe and learn from his behavior. Under these conditions, the utility of the decision
to approve a drug (or not), for instance, reflects not only the downstream consequences of
administering that drug to patients (or not), but also the downstream consequences of that
decision for scientists’ future choices about what stopping rules to use.
I will now describe a range of scenarios in which maximizing expected utility demon-
strably does require a Bayesian to attend to differences among noninformative stopping
rules. For ease of analysis, I will consider a case in which Krino is required to state up
front a policy for deciding whether or not to approve Mammona’s drug on the basis of her
experimental results, rather than a case involving repeated interactions. More specifically,
in addition to the assumptions specified above, I assume that Krino is to specify a likeli-
hood ratio LRf such that he will approve the drug if Mammona produces a likelihood ratio
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p(xi|θa)/p(xi|θ0) ≥ LRf in a fixed-sample experiment with some given sample size n, and a
likelihood ratio LRt such that he will approve the drug if Mammona produces a likelihood
ratio of at least LRt in a “target-likelihood ratio” experiment that terminates as soon as ei-
ther a given sample sizem > n is reached or p(xi|θa)/p(xi|θ0) ≥ c for some c that Mammona
specifies. Krino’s posterior probability ratio Pr(θa|xN )/Pr(θ0|xN ) after conditioning on the
data from either experiment depends on xN only through the likelihood ratio, so setting
LRt > LRf would amount to “penalizing” the target-likelihood ratio experiment relative
to the fixed-sample experiment by requiring a higher posterior probability ratio to approve
the drug if the first experiment is performed, and vice versa for LRt < LRf . Mammona
learns the values Krino specifies for LRf and LRt, and then chooses one of the available
stopping rules, administers her drug to patients in accordance with it, and reports both
the stopping rule and the resulting likelihood ratio. Krino then approves the drug or not
in accordance with the rule he specified in the beginning.1 I assume that H0 and Ha are
simple statistical hypotheses, so that p(xi|θa)/p(xi|θ0) has an objective value to which the
degrees of belief of an agent who satisfies the Principal Principle will conform. I assume
that Krino and Mammona’s degrees of belief conform to the Principal Principle in this case,
that they know this about themselves and each other, and that Mammona will choose the
stopping rule that maximizes her degree of belief that Krino will approve the drug. To
avoid uninteresting technical complications, I assume that the space of possible outcomes is
discrete.2
1The assumption that Krino binds himself to a particular course of action from the beginning of this
process is needed to avoid a paradox of deterrence (Kavka, 1978). Without this assumption, it could happen
that Krino attempts to deter Mammona from performing a target-likelihood-ratio experiment by setting
LRt to a value greater than the likelihood-ratio cutoff for rejecting H0 that would maximize his expected
utility if it were settled from the beginning that a target-likelihood-ratio experiment were to be performed.
One could then argue that if Mammona were to “call his bluff” by perfoming the target-likelihood-ratio
experiment anway, then he should not in fact use LRt as his likelihood-ratio cutoff for rejecting H0, but
the cutoff that maximizes his expected utility from that point forward. But if Mammona knows that he
will proceed in this way, then his attempt to deter her from performing a target-likelihood-ratio experiment
by setting LRt to a high value will be ineffective. This thorny issue does not arise in the scenario I have
specified, in which there is only one choice-point for Krino because he is bound to abide by the values for
LRf and LRt that he sets in the beginning. Krino may nevertheless update his degrees of belief in H0 and
Ha on whatever data Mammona provides, which may influence other decisions he will make in the future.
The assumption that Mammona will perform whatever experiment maximizes her probability that Krino
will approve the drug in this case rules out the possibility that she will perform that target-likelihood-ratio
experiment even if he sets LRt =∞ in order to influence the decisions he might make in future trials of the
same drug, for instance. To make this assumption plausible, it may be necessary to stipulate that Mammona
knows that Krino’s decision will never be revisited.
2The assumption that the space of possible outcomes is dicrete is always met in practice because we
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It is shown in Appendix A that under these circumstances, maximizing expected utility
always permits Krino to set LRt > LRf , thereby “penalizing” the target-likelihood ratio
stopping rule. Moreover, it requires him to do so if and only if ∆0 × P ×W > ∆a, where
∆0 is the amount by which moving from a fixed-sample experiment that Krino regards
as optimal to a target-likelihood ratio experiment with the same likelihood-ratio cutoff for
rejection increases the probability of a likelihood ratio that exceeds that cutoff under the null
hypothesis; ∆a is the corresponding quantity under the alternative hypothesis; P is the ratio
of Krino’s degree of belief in H0 to his degree of belief in Ha; andW is the ratio of the utility
for Krino of refraining from approving the drug if H0 is true to that of approving it if Ha is
true. Under this condition, maximizing expected utility allows Krino to set LRt =∞, which
is effectively the same as the standard practice of adopting a policy of disallowing target-
likelihood-ratio experiments. Thus, these results provide a partial Bayesian rationalization
for the standard frequentist practice of simply refusing to draw any conclusions from data
from experiments like Mammona’s.
It is shown in Appendix B that the condition ∆0 × P ×W > ∆a is satisfied exactly
when PW < (1 − β)/[α + ǫ],3 where β is the probability under Ha that a fixed-sample
experiment that Krino regards as optimal rejects H0 (sometimes called that experiment’s
“Type II error rate”), α is the corresponding probability under H0 (the “Type I error rate”),
and ǫ is the amount by which a target-likelihood-ratio experiment that Krino regards as
optimal falls short of the “universal bound” on the probability that an experiment will yield
a likelihood ratio of at least PW for Ha against H0 when H0 is true. It is always true
that PW ≤ (1 − β)/α, and as m increases ǫ goes very quickly to an upper bound that
approaches 0 as the amount by which the likelihood ratio is expected to overshoot c if it
reaches c approaches zero. Thus, PW < (1−β)/[α+ǫ] can be expected to hold as long as m
is not small and the expected overshoot is not large. It makes sense that this penalizing the
target-likelihood-ratio experiment may be unnecessary if the expected overshoot is large:
when it is large, the target-likelihood-ratio cutoff is less likely to be achieved, all else being
cannot measure or store arbitrary quantities of continuous quantities with perfect precision.
3The conditions ∆0×P ×W > ∆a and PW < (1−β)/[α+ ǫ] might seem to be in conflict, given that the
first says that PW is large, while the second says that PW is small. However, ∆0 is implicitly a function
of PW (see Appendix B).
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equal, so running the target-likelihood-ratio experiment is less likely to be advantageous to
Mammona.
The situation considered here is simpler than more realistic scenarios involving repeated
interactions, but it illustrates a general point: when a decision-maker’s choice of decision
policy can influence choices about stopping rules in ways that do not align with his or her
interests, maximizing expected utility may require him or her to attend to differences among
noninformative stopping rules. Doing so does not require any departure from standard
Bayesian conditioning: the stopping rule affects the expected-utility calculations through
the regulator’s utilities rather than his or her probabilities, reflecting the fact that he or she
has preferences about what experiments scientists will perform in the future. There are many
kinds of decision-makers who engage in repeated interactions with scientists whose interests
may not align with their own, including not only government regulators, but also other
scientists, journal editors, science journalists, evidence-based practitioners, and even the
general public. Any of these agents may need to attend to differences among noninformative
stopping rules in their decisions in order to avoid incentivizing the use of stopping rules that
they regard as undesirable. Thus, the fact that Bayesians sometimes need to attend to
differences among noninformative stopping rules in making decisions is not an idle curiosity,
but a key to understanding how Bayesian methods should be used in science.
5 Bayesians Account for Stopping Rules Insofar as They
Are Relevant
In the previous section, it was shown that a Bayesian decision-maker may need to attend to
differences among noninformative stopping rules when his or her choice of decision policy
could influence choices about stopping rules in ways that do not align with his or her
interests. But stopping rules play a larger role in classical statistics, where they always
enter into the calculations that are used to make inferences and decisions. In this section,
I defend the Bayesian position on stopping rules against three possible objections from
advocates of the classical statistical position.
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First, one might claim that stopping rules are relevant to the evidential import of the
data, and not just to decisions by way of utilities. This objection is difficult to resolve because
it is not clear to what the phrase “evidential import” refers, if anything. A Bayesian could
avoid it simply by declining to adopt any account of evidential import at all. However,
the claim that differences among noninformative stopping rules are irrelevant to eviden-
tial import is at least defensible. That claim follows from the Likelihood Principle, which
has strong axiomatic arguments in its favor (Birnbaum, 1962; Berger and Wolpert, 1988;
Gandenberger, 2015). It is also supported by the informal argument given in Section 2: a
difference in stopping rules amounts to a difference in experimenters’ intentions only, and
it seems odd to maintain that evidential relations between data and hypotheses depend
not only on the data and hypotheses themselves, but also on what the experimenters were
thinking when they generated the data. Thus, the Bayesian position on stopping rules can
be defended against this first objection.
As a second objection, one might claim that stopping rules are relevant to beliefs as well
as actions. For instance, it seems that Krino should be more reluctant not only to approve
the drug, but also to believe that the drug is more effective than the current standard of
care on the basis of Mammona’s results rather than Charis’s.
One possible response to this objection is to appeal to general arguments for Bayesian
conditioning, such as those that appeal to diachronic Dutch books. Advocates of classical
statistics do not accept the use of Bayesian conditioning for typical scientific hypotheses, but
they do accept it when the relevant prior probabilities are appropriately grounded in known
chances or frequencies. Thus, they take the position that differences among noninformative
stopping rules are relevant for beliefs when appropriate prior probabilities are unavailable
but not otherwise. The Bayesian position that they are irrelevant to beliefs in any sense
that is reducible to degrees of belief has many arguments in its favor and seems preferable
to this strangely disunified view.
Another possible response to this objection is to deny that full beliefs are reducible
to degrees of belief. Under Bayesian conditioning, one’s degrees of belief about a set of
hypotheses are unaffected by differences among stopping rules that are noninformative with
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respect to those hypotheses when conditioning on data produced by those stopping rules.
However, one might have a notion of full belief that is not reducible to Bayesian degrees of
belief and is spelled out, for instance, at least in part in terms of one’s dispositions to act
in certain ways under certain conditions. On such an account, it might come out as true
that Krino has the full belief that the drug is more effective than the current standard of
care if he receives Charis’s results but not if he receives Mammona’s, if it turns out that
maximizing expected utility would lead him to approve the drug on the basis of Charis’s
results but not Mammona’s.
A third possible response to this objection is that our intuitions about what is relevant to
belief are likely to be unreliable in this case. Perhaps those intuitions really track relevance
to decision, which generally coincides with relevance to belief but does not do so in this
case.
A final possible objection is that differences among noninformative stopping rules are
relevant to decisions in a broader range of circumstances than Bayesians can accommodate.
To take an extreme case, suppose an apocalyptic event left only one survivor. As it happens,
that survivor suffers from the ailment that Charis and Mammona’s drug is designed to treat.
She happens to find a supply of their drug and a report from one of their experiments. She
has to decide whether or not to take the drug. Should she take into account the stopping
rule that is described in the report? Given that there is (let us suppose) no prospect that
her decision will influence others’ choices regarding stopping rules in the future, Bayesian
principles seem to dictate that she should ignore the stopping rule. And yet, one might have
the intuition that she should be more hesitant to take the drug if she found Mammona’s
report rather than Charis’s.
The Bayesian position regarding this case may seem counterintuitive, but it seems to
be well supported by the standard arguments for Bayesian conditioning and the Likelihood
Principle. The most compelling arguments advocates of classical statistics give for attending
to stopping rules raise the worry that if we did not attend to them, then disingenuous
experimenters would be able to mislead us (see e.g . Mayo and Kruse, 2001). But this
worry does not arise in an apocalyptic scenario. Moreover, it arises in precisely the cases in
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which Bayesian principles also yield the conclusion that differences among noninformative
stopping rules are potential relevant to decisions. Beyond a bare appeal to somewhat shaky
intuitions, frequentists have no argument that we should attend more to differences among
noninformative stopping rules than standard Bayesian principles require.
6 Conclusion
Differences among noninformative stopping rules can make a difference to a Bayesian decision-
maker when his or her choice of decision policy could influence a choice regarding stopping
rules in ways that do not reflect his or her interests. This kind of situation is common in
science. As a result, Bayesian and classical statistics agree about the relevance of stopping
rules to decision-making to a greater extent than is usually recognized. Where the two
positions differ, I have argued that the Bayesian position can be defended against various
objections in addition to being supported by general arguments for the Likelihood Principle
and for Bayesian conditioning.
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A Proofs About When Expected Utility Maximization
Requires and When It Permits LRt > LRf
We can distinguish four possible outcomes of Mammona’s experiment for Krino. If H0 is
true, then he will either incorrectly approve the drug (a “Type I error”) or correctly decline to
approve it. If Ha is true, then he will either correctly approve the drug or incorrectly decline
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to approve it (a “Type II error”). The conditional probabilities of these outcomes are fixed
by Krino’s choice of a likelihood-ratio cutoff for approving the drug and the experimental
design. Thus, letting R indicate that H0 is rejected (i.e ., the drug is approved), we can
write the expected utility of a given experiment E for Krino as follows.4
EU(E) = PrE(R|H0) Pr(H0)U(Type I error) + PrE(¬R|H0) Pr(H0)U(correct non-rejection)
+ PrE(R|Ha) Pr(Ha)U(correct rejection) + PrE(¬R|Ha) Pr(Ha)U(Type II error)
= PrE(R|Ha) Pr(Ha)[U(correct rejection− U(Type II error)]
− PrE(R|H0) Pr(H0)[U(correct non-rejection− U(Type I error)]
+ Pr(H0)U(correct non-rejection) + Pr(Ha)U(Type II error) (1)
I assume that the prior probabilities in this equation are not affected by the experimental
design. This assumption is warranted by the stipulation that Krino knows that Mammona
simply chooses the design among those available to her which maximizes her probability that
Krino will approve the drug. Thus, her choice of experimental design cannot reveal anything
about her (possibly warranted) beliefs about the effectiveness of the drug. I assume also that
the utilities are not affected by the experimental design. This assumption is warranted by the
stipulation that the two simple statistical hypotheses H0 and Ha are the only possibilities;
thus, for instance, there is no uncertainty about how effective the drug is if a Type I error is
committed. Without this assumption, a Type I error could suggest different likely sizes of
departure from the null hypothesis depending on the experimental design, so that the cost
of a Type I error would not be the same across experimental designs.
Fix a “sample space” of possible sequences of observations. By equation 1, adding an ele-
ment x of that space to the “rejection region” of the experiment—that is, to the subset of the
sample space on which H0 is rejected—increases the expected utility of the experiment for
4Although the concepts of testing and rejecting hypotheses and of making Type I and Type II errors are
central to frequentist but not Bayesian thinking, there is nothing un-Bayesian about representing Krino’s
expected utility in this way. “Rejecting H0” here just means approving the drug, and thus does not relate
directly to any notion of full belief or acceptance that cannot be reduced to Bayesian degrees of belief. I am
simply considering the utilities for Krino of two possible acts (approve the drug, do not approve the drug)
in two possible states of affairs (H0 is true, Ha is true).
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Krino if and only if it increases PrE(R|Ha) Pr(Ha)[U(correct rejection− U(Type II error)]
for him more than it increases PrE(R|H0) Pr(H0)[U(correct non-rejection−U(Type I error)].
It does so if and only if the likelihood ratio PrE(x|Ha)/PrE(x|H0) exceeds PW , where P =
Pr(H0)/Pr(Ha) andW = [U(correct non-rejection−U(Type I error)]/[U(correct rejection−
U(Type II error)]. By assumption, P and W are not affected by the stopping rule. Thus,
the optimal experiment for Krino among those with a particular stopping rule uses the
likelihood-ratio cutoff PW for rejecting H0, regardless of the stopping rule.
Now, when the sample space is discrete, as I have assumed, using PW as the likelihood
ratio cutoff for rejection is not unique in maximizing the expected utility for Krino of a
given experiment E. If an element of the sample space has exactly that likelihood ratio,
then Krino is indifferent about including it in the rejection region. In addition, there will be
an open interval around PW that such that varying the likelihood-ratio cutoff for rejection
within that interval does not change the rejection region because there are no results in the
sample space that have likelihood ratios within that interval. This complication could be
avoided through the use of continuous sample spaces, but at the cost of introducing other
technical complications and the idealization of infinitely precise observations.
I have assumed that Mammona will choose the experiment that maximizes her prob-
ability that Krino approves the drug. Thus, if she performs the target-likelihod-ratio ex-
periment, then she will set the target likelihood ratio c that suffices to end the experiment
equal to the minimum value Krino specifies for the likelihood ratio LRt that would suffice
for him to approve the drug if the target-likelihood-ratio experiment is performed. Now, the
target-likelihood-ratio experiment will end with a likelihood ratio for Ha against H0 that
exceeds a particular threshold on every possible data sequence on which the fixed-sample
experiment would do likewise, as well as on some possible data sequences on which the
fixed-sample experiment would not do so. Thus, if Krino sets LRt ≤ LRf , then Mammona
will perform the target-likelihood-ratio experiment with c = LRt.
5 It follows that if the
optimal fixed-sample experiment with LRf = PW has greater expected utility for Krino
5The only exception to this implication occurs when LRt and LRf are so large that the probability that
the corresponding experiments would achieve them is zero. I will ignore this scenario by restricting attention
to cases in which it would not maximize Krino’s expected utility to set LRt and LRf so high that they
could not be achieved.
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than the optimal target-likelihood-ratio experiment with c = LRt = PW , then maximizing
expected utility requires him to set LRf to some value in a neighborhood around PW and
LRt to some value greater than PW that is sufficiently large to cause Mammona to choose
the fixed-sample experiment. Otherwise, it permits him to set LRf > LRt = PW , so that
Mammona will perform the target-likelihood ratio experiment with c = LRt = PW . Thus,
maximizing expected utility requires Krino to set LRt > LRf if and only if the optimal
fixed-sample experiment with LRf = PW has greater expected utility for Krino than the
optimal target-likelihood-ratio experiment among those that Mammona would choose (with
c = LRt = PW ).
Let Ef be the fixed-sample experiment with LRf = PW and Et the target-likelihood-
ratio experiment with c = LRt = PW . Then by the reasoning above, maximizing expected
utility requires Krino to set LRt > LRf if and only if the following condition is satisfied.
EU(Ef ) > EU(Et)
EU(Ef )− EU(Et) > 0
PrEf (R|Ha) Pr(Ha)[U(correct rejection)− U(Type II error)]
− PrEt(R|Ha) Pr(Ha)[U(correct rejection)− U(Type II error)]
− PrEf (R|H0) Pr(H0)[U(correct non-rejection)− U(Type I error)]
+ PrEt(R|H0) Pr(H0)[U(correct non-rejection)− U(Type I error)] > 0
[PrEt(R|H0)− PrEf (R|H0)] Pr(H0)[U(correct non-rejection)− U(Type I error)]
− [PrEt(R|Ha)− PrEf (R|Ha)] Pr(Ha)[U(correct rejection− U(Type II error))] > 0
[PrEt(R|H0)− PrEf (R|H0)] Pr(H0)[U(correct non-rejection)− U(Type I error)]
> [PrEt(R|Ha)− PrEf (R|Ha)] Pr(Ha)[U(correct rejection)− U(Type II error)]
[PrEt(R|H0)− PrEf (R|H0)]
Pr(H0)
Pr(Ha)
U(correct non-rejection)− U(Type I error)
U(correct rejection)− U(Type II error)
> [PrEt(R|Ha)− PrEf (R|Ha)]
∆0 × P ×W > ∆a
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where ∆0 = PrEt(R|H0)− PrEf (R|H0) and ∆a = PrEt(R|Ha)− PrEf (R|Ha).
Therefore, maximizing expected utility requires Krino to set LRt > LRf if and only
if ∆0 × P × W > ∆a. Under this condition, it permits him to set LRf = PW and
LRt = ∞, because doing so would lead Mammona to perform the experiment that he
regards as optimal.
Maximizing expected utility still permits Krino to set LRt > LRf when this condition is
not satisfied. In that case, the target-likelihood ratio experiment with c = LRt = PW has at
least as much expected utility for Krino as any other available experiment. Thus, maximizing
expected utility permits him to fix LRt and LRf in any way that would cause Mammona
to choose that experiment. That requires him to set LRt in a neighborhood around PW
and LRf sufficiently high that Mammona will choose the target-likelihood ratio experiment.
Setting LRf = LRt = PW would accomplish this goal, but so would setting LRt = PW
and LRf = LRt − ǫ for some ǫ > 0. At the very least, because of the discreteness of the
sample space, ǫ could be chosen to be sufficiently small that the fixed-sample experiment
with LRf = PW − ǫ has the same rejection region as Ef , so that Mammona would still
choose the target-likelihood-ratio experiment. It might also be possible to choose ǫ in a way
that adds elements to the rejection region while still keeping the probability of rejecting H0
for Mammona smaller on the fixed-sample experiment than on the target-likelihood-ratio
experiment, but that depends on the sample space and on Mammona’s probabilities for H0
and Ha. Therefore, maximizing expected utility always permits Krino to set LRt > LRf .
B Proof Regarding When ∆0 × P ×W > ∆a
Let δ = 1− PrEt(R|Ha). Then
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∆a = PrEt(R|Ha)− PrEf (R|Ha)
= (1 − δ)− PrEf (R|Ha)
= (1 − PrEf (R|Ha))− δ
= PrEf (¬R|Ha)− δ
= β − δ
Next, let ǫ = 1/PW − PrEt(R|H0). I claim in the main text that ǫ is the amount by
which a target-likelihood-ratio experiment that Krino regards as optimal falls short of the
“universal bound” on the probability that an experiment will yield a likelihood ratio of at
least PW for Ha against H0 when H0 is true. This claim follows from the fact that the
universal bound on the probability that an experiment will yield a likelihood ratio of at
least k for Ha against H0 when H0 is true is 1/k (Robbins, 1970).
So now we have
∆0 = PrEt(R|H0)− PrEf (R|H0)
= 1/PW − ǫ− α
and thus
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∆0 × P ×W > ∆a
[1/PW − ǫ− α]PW > β − δ
1− PW (α+ ǫ) > β − δ
PW (α+ ǫ) < 1− β + δ
PW <
1− β + δ
α+ ǫ
δ > 0, so it follows that ∆0 × P ×W > ∆a if PW < (1 − β)/(α + ǫ), as stated in the
main text.
It was also stated in the main text that PW ≤ (1 − β)/α. This claim follows from the
fact that the rejection region of Ef consists of the elements of the sample space on which
the likelihood ratio for Ha against H0 is at least PW . Thus, 1− β =
∑
i bi and α =
∑
i ai
for some {ai, bi} such that ai, bi > 0 and bi/ai ≥ PW for all i. As a consequence,
1− β
α
=
∑
i bi∑
i ai
=
∑
i
biai
ai∑
i ai
≥
∑
i PWai∑
ai
= PW
as stated.
A result from Blume (2002, 1201) entails that for a broad range of distributions over the
sample space (namely, those that come from a full exponential family), the limit of ǫ as m
goes to infinity is a decreasing function of the “expected overshoot” and is zero when the
expected overshoot is zero. The expected overshoot is the expected size of the difference
between the stopping boundary c and the likelihood ratio that occurs when it reaches that
boundary. As an illustration, suppose H0 says that the probability that a given patient will
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recover on Mammona and Charis’s drug is 3/7 (independent of any other patient outcomes),
while Ha says that it is 6/7. Then a single patient’s recovery generates a likelihood ratio
for Ha against H0 of (6/7)/(3/7) = 2, while a single patient’s failure to recover generates
a likelihood ratio for Ha against H0 of (1/7)/(4/7) = 1/4. The likelihood ratio for Ha
against H0 on the total data from multiple patients is simply the product of the individual
likelihood ratios. In this case, the expected overshoot is zero if c is a positive interval power
of two: if a likelihood ratio of c = 2n is achieved for some n ∈ {2, 4, 8, . . .}, then it is
achieved exactly. On the other hand, if c = 6, for instance, then the expected overshoot is
2: a likelihood ratio of at least 6 can only be achieved by passing from a likelihood ratio
of 4 to a likelihood ratio of 8. Cases with small expected overshoots are the cases in which
the target-likelihood-ratio experiment will be particularly attractive to Mammona. The
results given here show that they are also the cases in which ǫ is small, and thus the cases
in which maximizing expected utility requires Krino to penalize the target-likelihood-ratio
experiment for the sake of causing Mammona not to choose it.
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